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This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of inflation on post-war capital flight flows. 
I test the hypothesis that inflation has a positive additional impact on capital flight flows after 
war. I use a new panel dataset of 77 developing countries, of which 35 experienced at least one 
episode of war between 1971 and 2000. I use a range of estimation methods and four capital 
flight measures – Cline, World Bank Residual, Morgan Guarantee and Dooley. The results 
consistently support the research hypothesis: Post-war inflation increases annual capital flight 
flows by about 0.005 to 0.01 percentage points of GDP. This effect is substantial in total at high 
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1. INTRODUCTION   
 
To what extent does inflation affect capital flight flows after war? I investigate this 
question using a new panel dataset of 77 developing countries, of which 35 experienced 
at least one episode of war between 1971 and 2000, and 42 did not. I test the hypothesis 
that inflation has an additional positive impact on capital flight after war. The paper 
provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between capital flight and inflation post-
war, which, to my knowledge, has not yet been studied. Furthermore, I use a recent 
worldwide panel dataset on capital flight, the most recent of its kind, to my knowledge.  
 
Portfolio-choice theory suggests that capital flight is driven by relative risk-adjusted 
expected return. Inflation lowers the return to non-indexed assets and increases the 
opportunity cost of holding money. Consequently, inflation would stimulate capital flight 
in all circumstances. I hypothesize that capital flight is differentially sensitive to inflation 
after war. Information asymmetry leaves the government better placed than the public to 
assess the risks of a return to warfare. The public may rationally use the inflation rate 
which rises during war to gauge such risks, increasing the sensitivity of capital flight to 
inflation.  
 
I test the hypothesis on a panel of 77 countries of which 35 experienced at least one 
episode of war. The rest were always at peace. I use Ordinary Least Squares, Within-
Group, Generalized Least Squares, Two-Stage Least Squares and Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimation methods on annual data and four different measures of capital flight: the 
World Bank Residual, Cline, Dooley and Morgan measures. The results provide 
consistent evidence in support of the research hypothesis: Post-war inflation increases 
annual capital flight flows by about 0.005 to 0.01 percentage points of GDP. Relative to 
the average level of capital flight flows and the high inflation rates in post-conflict 
economies, the total effect could be substantial. The implication is that low inflation 
helps to curb capital flight in post-conflict economies. Low inflation might also induce 
domestic investment, generating tax revenues for the government and offsetting over time 
the loss of seigniorage revenues due to low inflation.  
 
In Section 2 I discuss conceptual and measurement issues relating to capital flight. In 
Section 3 I define and quantify war. I analyze the data in Section 4, undertake the 
econometric analysis in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.  
 
 
2. CAPITAL  FLIGHT  ISSUES 
 
I discuss key issues in empirical work on capital flight. 
 
 
2.1  What Drives Capital Flight? 
 
Portfolio-choice theory suggests that maximizing relative risk-adjusted expected return 
drives the choice between domestic assets and foreign assets (flight capital). The 
domestic determinants of relative expected return include risks, capital productivity, and 
their underlying determinants, notably the macroeconomic environment. The tax level   3
 
determines net return to capital. Ndikumana and Boyce (2003), Collier et al (2001), and 
Lensink et al (2000) report the debt stock to GDP ratio, which can be used to gauge 
future tax policy, as a significant positive determinant of capital flight. External 
borrowing could provide the resources for capital flight while capital flight can also 
induce external borrowing by reducing tax revenues and foreign exchange.  
 
The institutional environment facing private agents affects capital productivity notably 
through transactions costs. Bureaucratic corruption operates as a tax on investment. 
Exchange rate overvaluation induces devaluation expectations which could induce capital 
flight for hedging purposes. Ndikumana and Boyce (2003), Mikkelson (1991) and Vos 
(1992) and others have reported path dependence in capital flight: High levels of capital 
flight could generate expectations of a rise in taxes to offset the ensuing decline in tax 
revenues. Income growth might impact positively on expectations of the return to 
investment. The flight capital base – the quantity of capital that could potentially flee the 
economy – also matters. This could depend on external resource inflows and income 
levels. Lastly, sometimes the motivation for capital flight may be safekeeping of 
embezzled funds especially under some kleptocratic governments (Ndikumana and 
Boyce 1988, and Boyce 1992, 1993).  
 
War could stimulate capital flight directly by increasing political risk; and indirectly, 
through other variables that induce capital flight such as inflation and public debt. War 
termination could reduce capital flight by reducing political risks and providing new 
investment opportunities. However, fears of war resumption could heighten perceived 
risks. Aid inflows could also provide resources for capital flight. War termination’s effect 
on capital flight is therefore unpredictable. However, as peace endures capital flight is 
likely to decrease as perceived risks diminish. 
 
 
2.2  Key Issues in Capital Flight Estimation 
  
2.2.1 Conceptual issues 
There is no consensus definition of capital flight which broadly speaking, refers to private 
capital outflows from developing countries. Table 1, taken from Claessens and Naudé 
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Table 1: Stylized Balance of Payments 
A. Current Account 
     A1. Travel: credit  
     A2. Reinvested earnings on direct investment abroad 
     A3. Reinvested earnings on direct investment domestically 
     A4. Other investment income: credit  
B. Net Equity Flows 
    B1. Net Foreign Direct Investment 
    B2. Portfolio Investment: Corporate equities 
C. Other short-term capital of other sectors (net) 
D. Portfolio investment 
E. Change in deposit money banks’ foreign assets 
F. Reserves 
G. Net Errors and omissions  
H. Other long-term capital of resident official sector   
H′. Change in external debt 
 
According to the balance of payments identity: 
 
A + B + C + D + E + F + G + H = 0.                  
       
or 
  
C + D + E + G = -(A + B + F + H)                  
       
“Residual” measures estimate capital flight as the residual between an economy’s sources 
and uses of foreign exchange. In Table 1 this is given by (A + B + F + H) where sources 
of funds are net equity flows B, and changes in “other long-term capital of resident 
official sector” H, otherwise measured as change in external debt H′. Uses of foreign 
exchange are the current account balance A, and the change in foreign reserves, F. World 
Bank (1985), Morgan Guarantee (1986), Erbe (1985), Cline (1995), and Collier et al 
(2001 & 2004) are variants of the residual measure. For World Bank (1985), changes in 
gross foreign public debt and net foreign investment are the sources of funds. Morgan 
Guarantee (1986) subtracts the increase in short-term foreign assets of the banking 
system from World Bank to estimate the acquisition of foreign assets by the non-bank 
private sector. Collier et al (2001 & 2002) add repayment of private non-guaranteed debt 
to World Bank. Cline (1994) excludes private capital income retained abroad from the 
current account balance. Specifically, it subtracts travel (credit), reinvested foreign direct 
investment income (abroad and domestically), and other investment income (credit) 
items, often producing a smaller current account balance (bigger deficit), and smaller 
capital flight estimates. For all the above measures, the current account balance (however 
defined) and increase in reserves, constitute uses of foreign exchange. World Bank, Cline 
and Morgan Guarantee are computed as follows: 
 
World Bank: A + B + F + H’ 
Cline: A – (A1 + A2 + A3 + A4) + B + E + F + H’ 
Morgan:  A + B + E + F + H’ 
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Non-residual measures include Dooley (1986) who defines capital flight as illegitimate or 
undeclared foreign assets, that is the part of a country’s stock of foreign assets that does 
not generate income reported to the domestic authorities. For Cuddington (1986), capital 
flight is “hot money” fleeing political and financial crisis, heavier taxes, capital controls, 
currency devaluation, or hyperinflation. Collier et al (2004) estimate human capital flight 
– flight of educated human resource. Human capital flight estimation poses additional 
data and conceptual challenges.  
 
2.2.2 Practical Issues 
Capital flight is unobservable and therefore has to be estimated. In principle this could be 
done by summing up relevant balance of payments outflows. However, data constraints 
have led to proxies for some transactions. Moreover, some capital flight measures involve 
off-balance of payments transactions such as illegal activities with the Dooley measure. 
In some countries capital movement is illegal and therefore necessarily clandestine. 
However, the sheer illegality of capital flight is likely to affect its estimation but not its  
economic consequences. 
 
2.2.3 Difficult Choices 
Estimating capital flight involves the following difficult decisions: 
 
Accumulation issues 
An issue is whether to focus on stocks or flows. Flow estimates are common. Estimating 
stocks poses additional problems. Stocks are usually obtained by capitalizing the flows 
using a benchmark interest rate such as the US Treasury Bill rate. However, errors could 
result if that is not the actual interest rate applied to foreign assets. Most stock estimates 
ignore capital consumption. Flows may be more sensitive to war since they represent 
capital currently “fleeing” the domestic economy. Stocks also depend on external factors 
such as foreign interest rates. Data gaps further complicate stock estimation. Collier et al 
(2001 & 2004) view stocks as the relevant measure, arguing that capital flight is part of a 
wider portfolio decision involving total wealth stock, including foreign-based. However, 
estimating private wealth in developing countries is particularly challenging.  
 
Components issues 
Components issues bear on what to include or exclude in the estimates. An issue is 
whether to take into account the circumstances inducing capital flight such as economic 
or political crisis. Some definitions exclude “normal” outflows occurring in the absence 
of a crisis. 
 
Another question is whether to include private non-guaranteed debt. It may be argued that 
the simultaneous acquisition of a foreign asset and an offsetting foreign liability is not 
capital flight as the private sector’s net claims on foreign assets held abroad remains 
unchanged. However, Collier et al (2001) argue that the claims and liabilities generally 
do not refer to the same agents. 
 
Sometimes trade misinvoicing is included since underinvoicing of exports and 
overinvoicing of imports, with the discrepancy held abroad, constitute capital flight. 
However, import misinvoicing is subject to conflicting temptations (Cardoso and 
Dornbusch 1989): underinvoicing for tariff or quota avoidance, and overinvoicing for   6
 
capital flight. Thus, funds labelled capital flight may actually have financed unreported 
imports (Chang et al 1997).  
 
Data-related issues 
The US consumer price index is a common deflator to convert from nominal to real 
estimates. This assumes that the flight capital is held in the US. Using the ratio of 
nominal capital to nominal GDP obviates conversion. Also, exchange rate fluctuations 
can bias the estimates if flight capital stock is held outside the US.  
 
Negative values of capital flight are ambiguous: flight capital repatriation or unrecorded 
capital inflows? Negative stocks are even more problematic. Collier et al (2001, 2004) set 
a zero lower bound for their stock estimates because it is “gross of indebtedness”. This 
assumes that the negative values are due to indebtedness. They could be due to data error. 
Another issue is whether to capture changes in the debt stock that are not reflected in net 
flows of borrowings due to capitalization of arrears, rescheduling of principal or interest 
payments due, capitalization of penalties imposed, and debt forgiveness. Cash versus 
accruals accounting is another issue. Cash accounting raises the current account deficit, 




3      WAR ISSUES 
 
Definition and coverage 
Gleditsch et al (2002) define armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two or more parties, of 
which at least one is the government of a state, results in an accumulated total of at least 
25 battle-related deaths per year. The authors distinguish three categories of conflict 
intensity based on the number of battle-related deaths: 
*  Minor armed conflict:  fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of 
the conflict. 
*  Intermediate armed conflict: an accumulated total of at least 1,000 battle-related 
deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year. 
*  War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. 
 
I adapt the above definition of conflict by excluding minor armed conflicts as these are 
unlikely to trigger significant capital flight. I cover interstate armed conflict occurring 
between two or more states; and civil war occurring between the government of a state 
and internal opposition groups, with or without external intervention. Only host countries 
to conflict are considered to be at war, since a conflict fought abroad may not have the 
same effect on capital flight as a home conflict. I exclude colonial wars because colonial-
period data are typically lacking.  
 
Quantification 
I capture war through a “war” dummy variable with a value of 1 for countries 
experiencing war in a given year, and zero otherwise. Similarly, I capture the post-war 
period through a “postwar” dummy variable with a value of 1 if a country is in a post-war 
year and zero otherwise. I assume that the post-war period lasts for ten years after which   7
 
a country reverts to peace status. Table 2 shows that civil war is by far the most common 
type of conflict in the sample, accounting for about 76% of all conflict episodes. Next is 




Table 2: Conflict Statistics 
Type Frequency 
Inter-state war  21 







4. THE  DATA 
 
The estimation is based on annual data for a sample of 77 developing countries of which 
35 experienced at least one episode of war between 1971 and 2000, and 42 did not. The 
sample yields a total of over 2000 annual observations, of which there are about 360 war, 
and 270 post-war, observations. Appendix 1 lists the countries and Appendix 2 defines 
the variables and gives the data sources.  
 
I focus on four capital flight flow measures: Cline, Morgan, World Bank Residual and 
Dooley, whose computation is explained in Section 2. I consider flow estimates more 
appropriate than stocks to investigate the research question. Table 3 reports positive 
correlation coefficients ranging from 0.75 to 0.96 across the four measures. Table 4 gives 
sample means for the four measures. Unsurprisingly, the broadest, World Bank, measure 
gives the highest mean of 1.5% of GDP. That Cline gives the lowest and a negative mean 
estimate of -1.3% of GDP suggests that private capital income retained abroad, which 
Cline excludes, may be substantial. Capital flight is highest post-war for all measures 
except Dooley. For the World Bank and Dooley measures, capital flight falls slightly 
from peacetime to wartime: by 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points of GDP.  
 
 
Table 3: Correlations: Capital Flight Flow (% GDP) measures 
Pair of Measures   Correlation 
World Bank – Morgan  0.96 
World-Bank – Cline  0.86 
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Table 5 presents annual inflation by war status. Large levels and changes in the levels of 
inflation occur during and after war. Mean annual inflation more than triples from 34 
percent pre-war to 117 percent during wartime. It decreases to 67 percent post-conflict, 








5. ECONOMETRIC  ANALYSIS 
 
I estimate variants of the following baseline equation:  
 






= ∑    (1) 
         
i and t are country and time indices.  
CF is capital flight flows (% GDP).  
war is a dummy variable for a war episode.  
postwar is a dummy variable for a post-war period. 
inflpwar is an interaction term between inflation and the post-war variable. 
M is a vector of regressors   
D is a vector of dummy variables. 
The β’s are parameters or vectors of parameters 
 
The dependent variable is in turn the Cline, World Bank, Morgan and Dooley capital 
flight flow measures. The war and post-war dummies capture the direct impact of war 
and its aftermath on capital flight. An indirect effect might also operate through other 
Conflict countries  All countries  Capital flight 








Mean   Coefficient of 
variation % 
Cline -0.95  -0.12  0.04  -0.41 -2.0  -1.3  -743 
World Bank  1.7  1.6  2.3  1.8  1.1  1.5  595 
Morgan 0.94  1.1  1.7  1.2 0.76  0.96  909 
Dooley 1.8 1.6  1.6  1.6 0.60  1.1  1011 
Observations 380  320  250  950  1100  2100  2100 
Conflict countries 







34 117  67  73  41  56   9
 
regressors. I do not use the Institutional Investor Risk Rating index, another measure of 
risk, because it shrinks the data. I expect inflation, which tends to be correlated with 
political risks, and the war and post-war dummies, to help capture political risks. The 
World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index, an indicator of the 
institutional environment, is unavailable to outside researchers. However, such indices 
tend to be highly correlated with other capital flight determinants (Collier et al 2001), 
mitigating the effects of their omission. 
 
“Inflpwar” is an interaction term of inflation and “postwar”. Its coefficient, β3, has to be 
positive under the hypothesis that inflation has a positive additional impact on capital 
flight after war. M is a vector of controls comprising inflation, the Dollar real exchange 
rate overvaluation index, investment, per capita income, GDP growth and aid. I expect a 
positive inflation coefficient. The Dollar real exchange rate overvaluation index captures 
expectations of currency depreciation. By construction, the degree of overvaluation 
increases with the index (Dollar 1992). Thus, I expect its coefficient to be positive
1. I 
exclude the black market premium, a possible indicator of macroeconomic stability and 
the quality of governance, because it shrinks the data. Per capita income captures the 
flight capital base while GDP growth captures expectations of capital productivity. I 






= ∑ is lagged capital flight capturing 
path dependence. j is the longest lag. I also include time dummies in all the estimations. 
 
I use an annual worldwide unbalanced panel dataset of 77 countries over 1971-2000, 
from the IMF. I first test for stationarity of the variables using the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller and Philips Perron unit roots tests for panel data. The results, presented in 
Appendix 3, indicate that only per capita income is non-stationary. I therefore use instead 
the log of per capita income, which is stationary.  
 
Ordinary Least Squares estimation 
I start with Ordinary Least Squares robust estimation. Table 6 presents the Cline results 
and Appendices 4a-4c the others. As hypothesized, the inflation post-war interaction term 
coefficient is positive in all the regressions. Its coefficient ranges from 0.007 to 0.01 and 
is significant at 1%. In columns 5 and 6, I interact inflation with dummies for the first and 
second five post-war years. The interaction term for the first five post-war years is 
significant at 1% with coefficients ranging from 0.005 to 0.008 in all the regressions. The 
                                                 
1 The Dollar index measures the extent to which the real exchange rate is distorted away from its free trade 
level by the trade regime. The index is based on international comparisons of price levels on the same 
basket of goods compiled for 121 countries by Summers and Heston (1988). The Summers and Heston 
measure of country i’s relative price level (RPL) is given by:  
 
RPLi = 100 x ePi/PUS 
 
where e is the exchange rate (dollars per unit of domestic currency) and Pi is the consumption price index 
for country i and  PUS is US consumption price level. Dollar corrects for variations due to differences in 
factor endowment in the Summers and Heston indices by regressing the price levels (RPLi) on factor 
endowments, captured by per capita GDP and population density. The residuals from that regression 
indicate the extent to which a country’s prices are high or low, given its endowments. The higher the 
residuals the higher is the degree of inward orientation.  
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second five post-war years interaction term is insignificant in the World Bank and 
Morgan regressions, suggesting that for these measures, the positive additional impact of 
inflation is in the first five post-war years. For the Cline and Dooley measures the 
interaction term is significant at less than 10% with coefficients ranging from 0.005 to 
0.006.  
 
The war dummy is significant at less than 10% in the Cline regressions with a coefficient 
of 0.95 to 2.1. This suggests that by the Cline measure, capital flight flows are 0.95 to 2.1 
percentage points of GDP higher during wartime relative to peacetime. This effect is 
relatively large, given a Cline panel mean of -1.3% of GDP. The war dummy is 
significant only in the Cline regressions. The post-war dummy is mostly insignificant 
across the four capital flight measures. This suggests that after controlling for other 
determinants, wartime and peacetime capital flight flows are not significantly different. 
 
Lagged capital flight is significant in all the Cline and Dooley regressions, with 
coefficients ranging from around 0.3 to 0.4 (Cline) and 0.15 to 0.2 (Dooley). The implied 
degree of persistence in capital flight flows is of the order of 0.3 to 0.4, and 0.15 to 0.20, 
percentage points of GDP respectively. This is relatively high, given the panel average 
level of annual capital flight flows of -1.3% of GDP (Cline) and 1.1% of GDP (Dooley). 
The second and higher lags of the dependent variable were dropped, being insignificant 
in all the regressions, suggesting that any persistence is short-lived.  
Current investment is negatively significant at less than 10%, with a coefficient of about -
0.05 to -0.08 in the Cline regressions. The implied negative relationship accords with 
expectations: Higher relative rates of return in the domestic economy encourage 
investment and discourage capital flight. Lagged investment is generally insignificant 
across all measures except for Cline regression 5 where it is negatively significant at 9%. 
Current and lagged aid are insignificant in all the regressions, suggesting that there is no 
“round tripping” of capital flight flows wherein aid funds end up as flight capital. Current 
inflation is positively significant at less than 10% in the Morgan regressions. It is 
insignificant in the Dooley and World Bank regressions and significant in one of the two 
Cline regressions which control for it. The Dollar real exchange rate overvaluation index 
and its lag are insignificant in all the regressions. This implies that either the real 
exchange rate distortion from its free trade level, which the index purports to capture, has 
no net effect on capital flight flows; or the index does not really capture the distortion.   
 
Generalized Least Squares 
The final rows in the tables give the F statistic of the Wooldridge test for first order serial 
correlation in the regression residuals. Except for regressions 1 and 2 of the Cline, World 
Bank and Morgan regressions, the null of no serial correlation is rejected at 5%. I 
therefore undertake Generalized Least Squares estimation to correct for the serial 
correlation. The Cline results are presented in Table 7, and the others in Appendices 5a-
5c. The size and significance of the inflation post-war interaction term coefficient is 
largely unchanged relative to the preceding estimations: It is always significant at 1% 
with a coefficient of 0.005 to 0.009. The interaction term between inflation and the first 
five post-war years dummy is also significant at 5% with a coefficient of 0.006 to 0.01 
The post-war dummy in the Cline regressions is now significant at less than 5% with a 
coefficient of 1.3 to 1.8 while the war dummy is mostly significant at less than 10%. The 
war dummy is insignificant for the other capital flight measures. Lagged capital flight is   11
 
now positively significant at less than 5% across the Cline, Morgan and Dooley 
regressions; and also at less than 10% in all but one of the World Bank regressions. 
Investment, current or lagged, is also now positively significant at less than 1% in the 
Cline regressions. Lagged investment is insignificant in the World Bank, Morgan and 
Dooley regressions. Lagged aid is negatively significant at 1% across all four capital 
flight measures with a coefficient of -0.06 to -0.07. This suggests that a one percentage 
point increase in the aid to GNI ratio is associated with a 0.06 to 0.07 percentage point 
decrease in the capital flight flows to GDP ratio.  
 
Within-Group estimation 
The omission of unobserved country-specific factors could bias the OLS and GLS 
estimates. Random effects, within-group and first-differenced GMM estimation methods 
could address this source of endogeneity. However, random effects estimation is 
inappropriate when lags of the dependent variable are used as regressors because of their 
correlation with the unobserved country-specific effect. First-differenced GMM might 
also be inappropriate when the time span is long because it produces a large instrument 
set, leading to “over-fitting” and undesirable closeness to the OLS coefficients (see 
Alvarez and Arellano 2003). I therefore implement Within-Group estimation to control 
for unobserved country-specific factors. Within-Group estimation’s drawback, however, 
is that the mean differencing of the variables could sweep away much of the variation 
from the slow-changing regressors, reducing significance levels.  
Table 8 and Appendices 6a-6c contain the estimation results. The inflation and post-war 
interaction term estimates are generally similar to the preceding OLS estimates. The 
interaction term is always significant at 1% with a coefficient of 0.005 to 0.009. The 
estimates for the interaction term of the post-war half decadal dummies and inflation are 
also similar to the OLS estimates. Current investment is now statistically significant at 
less than 5% in all the regressions with a coefficient of -0.11 to -0.22. Lagged capital 
flight is significant at less than 5% in the Cline and Morgan Guarantee regressions with a 
coefficient of 0.15 to 0.24 while it is mostly insignificant in the World Bank and Dooley 
regressions.  
 
Two-Stage Least Squares estimation 
The preceding estimation methods fail to address the possibility of simultaneity between 
capital flight and some of the regressors. For instance simultaneity can occur if capital 
flight shrinks the tax base and increases reliance on aid. To investigate whether indeed 
aid is endogenous, I carry out Two-Stage Least Squares estimation, following Tavares 
(2003) to instrument for aid. Tavares’ underlying idea is that bilateral donor governments 
provide aid to an extent according to historical ties and domestic budgetary circumstances 
that are unrelated to circumstances in the recipient country. I proceed as follows: For 
each of the five largest OECD aid donors – United States, United Kingdom, Japan, 
Germany and France – I compute three variables capturing proximity between the donor 
and each country in the sample. The first variable is physical proximity given by the 
inverse of the distance between aid donor and aid recipient capital cities. Second is a 
dummy variable for linguistic proximity which takes a value of one if the official 
language of the aid donor and recipient is the same, and zero otherwise. Third is a 
dummy variable for religious proximity which takes a value of one if aid donor and 
recipient share the same dominant religion, and zero otherwise. I then interact the three   12
 
variables with the donor country’s aid to GNI ratio. I drop the interaction terms for the 
same language as Japan and Germany because no aid recipient satisfies those criteria.  
 
The estimation results, reported in Table 9 for the Cline measure, and Appendices 7a-7c 
for the others, support the research hypothesis: The interaction terms between inflation 
and the dummy for the post-war period as a whole, and the dummy for first half-decadal 
post-war period, are positively significant at 1% across all the regressions. The size of 
either coefficient, 0.007 to 0.009, is also similar to those from the preceding estimations. 
Aid, considered as the endogenous regressor, is statistically insignificant across all the 
regressions. The Cline estimates tend to be more significant than those from the 
preceding estimation methods. However, the post-war dummy is significant only at 6 to 
8%, compared with 5% in the GLS. In addition, inflation is positively significant at 10% 
or less, although its coefficient is close to zero. The controls in the World Bank, Morgan 
and Dooley regressions are mostly insignificant.  
The last row in the tables gives the F statistic of the Davidson-Mackinnon (1993) test for 
the endogeneity of aid. The test involves first regressing the endogenous variable (aid) on 
all the exogenous variables in the model to obtain predicted aid. The original capital 
flight model is then estimated with predicted aid as an additional regressor. An F test is 
then used to test the null that predicted aid is not statistically different from zero. 
Rejection of the null implies that aid is endogenous and OLS estimation is inconsistent. 
For the Cline, World Bank and Morgan regressions, the null cannot be rejected. Thus, aid 
is not endogenous in these regressions and OLS estimation is consistent. The null is 
rejected in all but the last Dooley regressions. Appendix 8 presents the first-stage 
regression results. In every case the F statistic is approximately zero, indicating the joint 
significance of the regressors. 
 
Arellano-Bond First-Differenced GMM 
While consistent in small sample, the OLS and Within-Group estimates of the coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable in Equation 1 are biased upwards and downwards 
respectively (see Nicke1 1981). I therefore implement the Arellano-Bond First-
Differenced GMM estimator (the A-B GMM estimator for short) as an additional 
robustness check. This estimator seeks to address the problems posed by using lagged 
dependent variables as regressors as well as other sources of endogeneity. To implement 






it j i t j it it i it
j
cf cf x w v e αλ θ −
=
=+ + + + ∑        (2) 
 
where x represents the strictly exogenous variables, w the endogenous regressors and v 
the unobserved country-specific effects. α,  λ and θ are parameters. The A-B GMM 
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=
Δ= Δ + Δ+ Δ ∑         (3) 
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I estimate Equation 3 using lagged levels of the dependent variable and the endogenous 







Δ ∑  and  it w Δ respectively.  it x Δ , being strictly 
exogenous, serves as its own instruments.  
 
I estimate a parsimonious version of Equation 3 using only the first lag of the dependent 
variable, and taking the inflation post-war interaction term, and the war and post-war 
dummies as strictly exogenous. All other regressors are assumed endogenous. I use the 
one-step variant of the A-B GMM estimator as recommended by the authors, Arellano 
and Bond (1991), for inference on the parameter estimates.  
 
Table 10 presents the estimation results. The inflation post-war interaction term estimates 
are similar to those from the other estimation methods. The coefficient of the interaction 
term ranges from 0.008 to 0.011 and is statistically significant at 1%. Investment is also 
statistically significant at less than 5% with a coefficient of -0.23 to -0.38. Inflation is 
significant at less than 5% in the World Bank and Dooley model, and insignificant in the 
other models. In all four estimations the Sargan test statistic indicates support for the 
validity of the over-identifying restrictions. 
  
The A-B GMM estimator has its own drawbacks. Notably, the differencing of slow-
moving regressors may lead to low statistical significance. Furthermore, lagged levels of 
variables are often poor instruments for first differences. 
 
A synthesis 
The interaction terms between inflation and the dummy for the post-war period as a 
whole, and for the first five post-war years, are positively significant at 1 to 5% across 
virtually all regressions, consistent with the hypothesis that inflation has an additional 
positive impact on capital flight after war. With a coefficient of 0.005 to 0.01, a one 
percentage point reduction in the post-conflict inflation rate leads to a reduction in annual 
capital flight flows by 0.005 to 0.01 percentage points of GDP. Given mean annual 
wartime inflation rate of 117%, and 67% post-war (Table 5), and mean capital flight 
flows ranging from -1.3% of GDP (Cline) to 1.5% (World Bank), the total effect could be 
substantial. Consequently, reducing inflation offers some scope for reducing post-conflict 
capital flight, especially in high-inflation countries like Argentina with post-war inflation 
rates of over 600% in 1984 and 1985.  
 
Except for the Within-Group and Arellano-Bond GMM estimates, the Cline war dummy 
is generally positively significant at less than 10% with coefficients ranging from 0.95 to 
2.1. Thus, relative to peacetime, the average country shifts abroad every year an 
additional 0.95 to 2.1 percentage points of GDP as Cline capital flight during wartime. 
This is hardly surprising, given the increase in risks during war. However, the size of the 
increase is large, given mean Cline capital flight flows of -0.95% of GDP during 
peacetime. The insignificance of the Within-Group and Arellano-Bond estimates may be 
due to the differencing of the variables in these estimation techniques. This reduces 
statistical significance, especially for slowing-changing regessors like the war and post-
war dummies. The evidence on post-war capital flight flows is conflict with some of the 
results indicating an increase relative to peacetime while others indicate a decrease.   14
 
 
Except for the Arellano-Bond estimates, a consistent positive relationship between Cline 
capital flight and its first lag emerges from the estimation results, with a coefficient 
estimate of 0.16 to 0.41. This indicates some degree of persistence in Cline capital flight 
flows. A similar positive relationship holds for the Dooley measure except for some of 
the Within-Group regressions. The second and higher lags are all statistically 
insignificant across all four capital flight measures, implying the absence of long-term 
persistence in all capital flight measures. Another consistent effect is a negative effect of 
investment or/and its lag on Cline capital flight flows with a coefficient estimate of -0.05 
to -0.19 for investment. Inflation and its lag on are often positively significant with a 
coefficient of 0.001, suggesting that inflation increases capital flight flows in all 
circumstances. 
 
The log of per capita income, aid and GDP growth show no consistent relationship with 
capital flight, being statistically insignificant in some regressions and insignificant in 
others. The Dollar real exchange rate overvaluation index is never significant. This could 
imply that distortion of the real exchange rate from its free trade level, which the index 
purports to capture, has no net effect on capital flight flows; or the index fails to capture 
the distortion.  
 
The Two-Stage Least Squares results suggest that aid is not endogenous in the Cline, 
World Bank and Morgan specifications, implying that OLS estimation is consistent and 
preferable to Two-Stage Least Squares. On the other hand, the results suggest that aid is 
endogenous in the Dooley regressions, implying that OLS estimation is inconsistent and 
Two-Stage Least Squares estimation is preferable. 
   15
 
Table 6: Cline OLS Results                 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008     Inflation &  post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
  2.116 0.947 1.207 1.202 1.022 1.203  War dummy 
  (0.00)***  (0.08)*  (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.04)** (0.01)** 
  1.762 1.494 0.784 0.882 0.860 0.809  post-war dummy 
  (0.05)**  (0.02)**  (0.38) (0.28) (0.35) (0.37) 
  0.408  0.326  0.336  0.327  0.326  dependent variable: 1st lag 
  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
   (0.36)  (0.50)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
  -0.246    -0.346  -0.299  log of per capita income 
  (0.43)    (0.27)  (0.10) 
     0.008  0.008  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
     0.006  0.006  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & 
inflation       (0.06)*  (0.04)** 
   -0.038  -0.036   -0.038  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.35)  (0.40)   (0.35) 
   0.000  0.000   0.000  lagged inflation % 
   (0.25)  (0.26)   (0.25) 
   -0.046  -0.071   -0.045  lagged investment % 
   (0.17)  (0.09)*   (0.18) 
  -0.030    -0.032    GDP growth % 
  (0.40)    (0.36)   
  0.000    0.000    Inflation % 
  (0.13)    (0.02)**   
  -0.052    -0.077    investment % GDP 
  (0.06)*    (0.03)**   
  0.000    -0.034    aid % GNI 
  (1.00)    (0.64)   
    -0.059     lagged aid % GNI 
    ( 0 . 5 4 )     
   -0.288      lagged log of per capita income 
   (0.12)     
  0.001       Dollar overvaluation index 
  ( 0 . 3 5 )       
Observations  1821 1821 1484 1556 1527 1542 1556 
R-squared  0.12 0.13 0.32 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
















Robust p values in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        16
 
Table 7: Cline GLS Results           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.008 0.008 0.008     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
0.551 1.112 1.050 0.965 1.110  war dummy 
(0.21) (0.05)**  (0.06)*  (0.09)*  (0.05)** 
1.779 1.236 1.417 1.548 1.297  post-war dummy 
(0.00)***  (0.04)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.04)** 
-0.009     -0.009   GDP growth % 
(0.78)     (0.82)  
0.000     0.000   Inflation % 
(0.62)     (0.44)  
-0.000       Dollar overvaluation index 
(0.93)      
-0.089     -0.152   investment %GDP 
(0.00)***     (0.00)***  
-0.045     -0.066   aid %GNI 
(0.03)**     (0.01)***   
0.399 0.211 0.219 0.210 0.211  Lagged dependent variable 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
-0.363     -0.346 -0.101  log of per capita income 
(0.09)*     (0.21)  (0.65) 
 0.004  -0.001   0.004  lagged GDP growth % 
 (0.91)  (0.99)   (0.91) 
 0.000  0.000   0.000  lagged inflation % 
 (0.18)  (0.17)   (0.18) 
  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
  (0.46) (0.49) (0.53) (0.45) 
 -0.102  -0.113   -0.102  lagged investment % 
 (0.00)***  (0.00)***   (0.00)*** 
 -0.101      lagged log of per capita income 
 (0.65)     
   0.008  0.008  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
   0.003  0.004  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.66)  (0.60) 
  -0.074     lagged aid %GNI 
  (0.00)***    
Observations  1484 1556 1527 1542 1556 
Number  of  id  62 63 62 62 63 
p values in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%          17
 
Table 8: Cline Within-Group Results              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.009 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.009     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
  1.730 0.852 1.200 0.994 1.183 1.231  war dummy 
  (0.04)**  (0.30) (0.18) (0.24) (0.18) (0.18) 
  0.797 1.071 0.415 0.544 0.600 0.472  post-war dummy 
  (0.51) (0.28) (0.72) (0.59) (0.60) (0.68) 
  0.236  0.163  0.173  0.160  0.163  dependent variable: 1st lag 
  (0.00)***  (0.08)*  (0.05)**  (0.08)*  (0.08)* 
   -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
   (0.28)  (0.10)  (0.20)  (0.31) 
  1.308    3.445  2.358  log of per capita income 
  (0.27)    (0.13)  (0.30) 
     0.009  0.009  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
     0.004  0.004  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & 
inflation       (0.28)  (0.25) 
   -0.020  -0.025   -0.023  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.63)  (0.56)   (0.58) 
   0.000  0.000   0.000  lagged inflation % 
   (0.24)  (0.27)   (0.25) 
   -0.133  -0.083   -0.129  lagged investment % 
   (0.05)*  (0.04)**   (0.05)* 
  0.001    -0.004    GDP growth % 
  (0.98)    (0.92)   
  0.000    0.000    Inflation % 
  (0.81)    (0.12)   
  -0.126    -0.192    investment % GDP 
  (0.00)***    (0.01)**   
  0.039    0.046    aid % GNI 
  (0.67)    (0.56)   
    -0.139     lagged aid % GNI 
    ( 0 . 4 7 )     
   2.609      Lagged log of per capita income 
   (0.27)     
  -0.001       Dollar overvaluation index 
  ( 0 . 2 4 )       
Observations  1821 1821 1484 1556 1527 1542 1556 
Number  of  id  72 72 62 63 62 62 63 
R-squared  0.13 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Robust p values in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                18
 
Table 9: Cline 2SLS Results         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.009 0.008 0.009     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
1.701 1.126 1.833 1.708 1.840  war dummy 
(0.00)*** (0.02)**  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
1.957 0.963 1.879 1.985 1.892  post-war dummy 
(0.06)* (0.28)  (0.08)* (0.07)* (0.08)* 
-0.026 -0.032   -0.025   GDP growth % 
(0.52) (0.38)   (0.53)  
0.000 0.000   0.000   Inflation % 
(0.01)** (0.10)*    (0.01)**  
0.000 -0.001  0.000 0.000 0.000  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
(0.85) (0.59) (0.75) (0.87) (0.77) 
-0.129 -0.109   -0.127   investment %GDP 
(0.00)*** (0.00)***   (0.00)***  
-0.023 -0.069 0.014  -0.011 0.026  aid %GNI 
(0.83) (0.48) (0.90) (0.92) (0.82) 
 0.331      lagged dependent variable 
 (0.00)***     
   0.009  0.009  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
   0.007  0.007  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.04)**  (0.03)** 
  -0.046   -0.047  lagged GDP growth % 
  (0.31)   (0.31) 
  0.001   0.001  lagged inflation % 
  (0.01)**   (0.01)** 
  -0.094   -0.092  lagged investment % 
  (0.01)**   (0.01)** 
Observations  1519 1513 1503 1519 1503 













Robust p values in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%              19
 
Table 10: Arellano-Bond GMM Results         
 Cline  World  Bank    Morgan Dooley 
0.008 0.007  0.011 0.006  Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)***  (0.00)*** (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
1.88 -0.155  1.00 0.092  war dummy 
(0.44) (0.89)  (0.67) (0.95) 
1.73 -0.42  1.69 -0.26  post-war dummy 
(0.58) (0.71)  (0.559)  (0.847) 
0.038 0.077  0.042 0.09  GDP growth %            
(0.67) (0.414)  (0.66) (0.41) 
-0.256 -0.237  -0.227 -0.38  Investment % GDP      
(0.00)***  (0.01)*** (0.01)**  (0.004)** 
0.065 0.118  0.13  0.21  aid %GNI                    
(0.75) (0.59)  (0.58) (0.32) 
0.117 0.048  0.045 0.049  lagged dependent variable 
(0.14) (0.36)  (0.50) (0.17) 
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.003  Inflation                        
(0.89) (0.17)  (0.67) (0.10) 
Z value  -0.41 -0.44  -0.50 -0.72  Test statistic for 2nd order autocorrelation 
p-value  0.678 0.659  0.619 0.473 
Robust p values in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%            




I have studied the relationship between inflation and capital flight after war, an hitherto 
unresearched issue in the literature. I have generated consistent evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that inflation has an additional positive impact on capital flight flows after war. The 
evidence has proved robust to four measures of capital flight and several econometric estimation 
techniques. The evidence suggests that for a typical post-conflict economy, a one percentage 
point increase in inflation is associated with a 0.005 to 0.01 percentage point of GDP increase in 
capital flight flows. Relative to the average level of capital flight flows, and the high and 
sustained inflation rates that some post-conflict economies experience, the total effect could be 
substantial. The key implication is that low inflation helps to stem and reverse capital flight 
flows in post-conflict economies. This finding potentially raises a dilemma for post-conflict 
economies: Low inflation implies the loss of seigniorage revenues. With large financing needs 
the sacrifice could be poignant, if not unacceptable. The appropriate decision to adopt in such 
circumstances would depend on the circumstances of the economy such as macroeconomic 
conditions upon war termination. For high-inflation economies the benefits of reducing inflation 
could be substantial: Large reductions in capital flight would be realized. For all economies low 
inflation is generally propitious for economic activity. Thus the reduction in capital flight can be 
seen as an additional benefit of low inflation after war. The reduction might in turn induce 
domestic investment, generating tax revenues for the government and offsetting over time the 
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Appendix 1a: Conflict Episodes  
Type of war experienced:   Country 
Interstate war  Civil war  Internationalised civil war 
Algeria   1993-   
Argentina   1975-77   
Bangladesh 1991  1987-92   
Burundi   1997-   
Chad 1987  1989-90  1965-88,  1998-99 
Colombia   1980-   
Congo, Brazzaville      1997-99 
Congo, DRC    1964-65, 1978  1997- 
Egypt  1967, 1969-70, 1973    1967, 1969-70 
El Salvador  1969  1981-91   
Guatemala   1968-95   
Honduras 1969     
Indonesia 1962-66,  -1961,  1975-89,  1992 
1997-98 
 
Iran 1980-88  1966-68,  1979-88,  1990-93, 1996-97, 1999-   
Lao (PDR)    1989-90  -1961, 1963-73 
Lebanon     1976-90 
Libya 1987    1987 
Morocco   1980-89  1975-79 
Mozambique   1981-88,  1991-92  1989-90 
Nicaragua   1978-79,  1983-89   
Nigeria   1967-70   
Peru   1981-99   
Philippines 1969-75  1972-   
Rwanda   1991-94,  1998-    1997- 
Senegal   1999-  1998-99 
Sierra Leone    1994-99  2000 
Somalia   1987-96   
South Africa    1979-88  1975-76, 1987-88 
Sri Lanka    1971, 1985-   
Sudan   1963-72,  1983-   
Syria 1967,  1973  1982  1979-82 
Thailand 1966,  1974-75  1974-82   
Tunisia 1961     
Uganda   1981-91,  1994-  1997- 
Zimbabwe   1976-79   
 
 
Appendix 1b: Non-conflict countries 
Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire,  Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Republic of Korea, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Niger, Oman, Papua New Guinea, 
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Appendix 2: Definitions of variables and data sources 
Name of variable  Definition  Source 
Aid   official development assistance (ODA) and 
 official aid % of gross national income. 
WDI 2006 
Cline capital flight measure  see text  IMF 
Dollar real exchange rate 
overvaluation index  
An index of real exchange rate distortion 
 constructed by Dollar (1992) 
GDN 
Dooley capital flight measure  see text  IMF 
GDP growth  % growth rate of real GDP  WDI 2006 
Inflation   inflation rate %  WDI 2006 
inflpwar  interaction term between inflation  
and the post-war variable 
 
investment   gross fixed capital formation % GDP  WDI 2006 
Morgan-Guarantee  
capita flight measure 
see text  IMF 
Per capita income  Per capita GDP  WDI 2006 
postwar  post-war dummy  Constructed using data  
from Gleditsch et al (2002) 
War  War dummy  Constructed using 
data from Gleditsch et al (2002) 
World Bank capital flight measure  see text  IMF 
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Appendix 3: Unit roots test 
Variable  ADF Fischer Chi-Squared 
Test statistic 
PP Fischer Chi-Squared 
Test statistic 








































Per capita income 
 
  




Notes: the null of both tests is unit roots.  
p-values in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  26
 
Appendix 4a: World Bank OLS Results               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.009 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.007     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
  0.514 0.327 0.233 0.184 0.165 0.232  war dummy 
  (0.33) (0.56) (0.61) (0.71) (0.75) (0.62) 
  0.712 1.227 0.484 0.521 0.526 0.531  post-war dummy 
  (0.41) (0.05)**  (0.58) (0.52) (0.56) (0.55) 
  0.261  0.158  0.166  0.158  0.158  dependent variable: 1st lag 
  (0.00)***  (0.19)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.19) 
   -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
   (0.45)  (0.55)  (0.26)  (0.44) 
  0.258    0.125  -0.049  log of per capita income 
  (0.38)    (0.67)  (0.77) 
     0.007  0.007  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
     0.003  0.004  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & 
inflation       (0.21)  (0.17) 
   -0.042  -0.042   -0.042  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.26)  (0.28)   (0.26) 
   0.001  0.001   0.001  lagged inflation % 
   (0.08)*  (0.09)*   (0.08)* 
   0.010  -0.001   0.010  lagged investment % 
   (0.74)  (0.97)   (0.75) 
  -0.026    -0.015    GDP growth % 
  (0.42)    (0.65)   
  0.000    0.001    Inflation 
  (0.19)    (0.18)   
  -0.008    -0.024    Invest 
  (0.75)    (0.43)   
  0.068    0.027    Aid 
  (0.34)    (0.70)   
    -0.046     lagged aid % GNI 
    ( 0 . 6 0 )     
   -0.050      lagged log of per capita income 
   (0.76)     
  0.001       Dollar overvaluation index 
  ( 0 . 3 0 )       
observations  1891 1891 1530 1603 1574 1590 1603 
R-squared  0.10 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 














Robust p values in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%              
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Appendix 4b: Morgan OLS Results               
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
0.009 0.009 0.005 0.007  0.007      Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.04)**  (0.01)** (0.02)**    
 0.422  0.152  0.100  0.093  -0.001  0.095  war dummy 
  (0.31)  (0.77)  (0.82) (0.84) (1.00) (0.83) 
  0.656  1.212  0.403 0.461 0.440 0.447  post-war dummy 
  (0.45)  (0.07)* (0.68) (0.61) (0.66) (0.65) 
  0.251  0.165  0.173  0.161  0.165  dependent variable: 1st lag 
  (0.00)***  (0.12)  (0.09)*  (0.13)  (0.13) 
   -0.003  -0.001  -0.002  -0.003  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
   (0.64)  (0.78)  (0.79)  (0.63) 
  0.109      -0.023  -0.095  log of per capita income 
  (0.73)      (0.94)  (0.58) 
       0.008  0.008  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
       (0.04)**  (0.01)** 
       0.004  0.004  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
       (0.17)  (0.16) 
   -0.048  -0.047    -0.048  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.21)  (0.24)    (0.21) 
   0.000  0.000    0.000  lagged inflation % 
   (0.22)  (0.23)    (0.24) 
   -0.003  -0.015    -0.002  lagged investment % 
   (0.93)  (0.68)    (0.94) 
  -0.039      -0.028    GDP growth % 
  (0.25)      (0.39)   
  0.000      0.000    Inflation 
  (0.07)*      (0.05)**   
  -0.012      -0.032    Invest 
  (0.66)      (0.34)   
  0.044      -0.000    aid % GNI 
  (0.54)      (1.00)   
     -0.047      lagged aid % GNI 
     (0.60)     
   -0.093        Lagged log of per capita income 
   (0.59)       
  0.001          Dollar overvaluation index 
  (0.37)         
observations  1862 1862 1498 1571  1542  1557  1571 
R-squared  0.11 0.11 0.17 0.11  0.12  0.11  0.11 
















Robust p values in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                28
 
Appendix 4c: Dooley OLS Results               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.007     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
  0.697 0.447 0.433 0.367 0.340 0.428  war dummy 
  (0.25) (0.48) (0.44) (0.53) (0.57) (0.45) 
  0.379 1.347 0.484 0.551 0.576 0.489  post-war dummy 
  (0.70) (0.07)*  (0.64) (0.56) (0.58) (0.64) 
  0.209  0.145  0.153  0.149  0.145  Dependent variable: 1st  lag 
  (0.00)***  (0.04)**  (0.03)**  (0.04)**  (0.04)** 
   -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
   (0.52)  (0.64)  (0.28)  (0.51) 
  0.239    0.174  -0.046  log of per capita income 
  (0.51)    (0.63)  (0.86) 
     0.006  0.006  Interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
     0.005  0.006  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & 
inflation       (0.09)*  (0.04)** 
   -0.082  -0.086   -0.082  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.09)*  (0.08)*   (0.09)* 
   0.001  0.001   0.001  lagged inflation % 
   (0.12)  (0.12)   (0.12) 
   -0.025  -0.035   -0.024  lagged investment % 
   (0.63)  (0.51)   (0.65) 
  -0.070    -0.069    GDP growth % 
  (0.18)    (0.19)   
  0.000    0.000    Inflation 
  (0.20)    (0.19)   
  -0.051    -0.075    Invest 
  (0.32)    (0.17)   
  0.052    0.022    Aid 
  (0.47)    (0.76)   
    -0.063     lagged aid % GNI 
    ( 0 . 4 9 )     
   -0.028      lagged log of per capita income 
   (0.91)     
  0.000       Dollar overvaluation index 
  ( 0 . 6 0 )       
observations  1852 1852 1502 1574 1545 1561 1574 
R-squared  0.05 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 

















Robust p values in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                29
 
Appendix 5a: World Bank GLS Results           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.005 0.009 0.009     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
0.137 0.565 0.564 0.326 0.568  war dummy 
(0.76) (0.32) (0.32) (0.57) (0.32) 
1.115 0.286 0.524 0.267 0.384  post-war dummy 
(0.03)**  (0.63) (0.38) (0.67) (0.53) 
0.002     0.009   GDP growth % 
(0.96)     (0.80)  
0.000     0.001   Inflation % 
(0.05)**     (0.02)**  
0.000       Dollar overvaluation index 
(0.91)      
-0.030     -0.074   investment % GDP 
(0.23)     (0.02)**   
0.025     -0.013    aid %GNI 
(0.23)     (0.61)  
0.293 0.050 0.054 0.044 0.050  Lagged dependent variable 
(0.00)*** (0.07)*  (0.05)*  (0.12)  (0.07)* 
0.121     0.050 0.090  log of per capita income 
(0.53)     (0.83) (0.64) 
 -0.028  -0.030   -0.028  lagged GDP growth % 
 (0.43)  (0.40)   (0.42) 
 0.001  0.001   0.001  lagged inflation % 
 (0.00)***  (0.00)***   (0.00)*** 
  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
  (0.13) (0.09)*  (0.16) (0.13) 
 -0.019  -0.023   -0.020  lagged investment % 
 (0.53)  (0.41)   (0.51) 
 0.075      Lagged log of per capita income 
 (0.69)     
   0.010  0.009  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
   0.004  0.003  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.61)  (0.63) 
  -0.058     lagged aid % GNI 
  (0.00)***    
observations  1530 1603 1574 1590 1603 
Number  of  id  63 64 63 63 64 
p values in parentheses           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%            30
 
Appendix 5b: Morgan GLS Results               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.009 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.02)**  (0.01)**     
  0.894 -0.116  0.325 0.388 0.199 0.316  war dummy 
  (0.16) (0.80) (0.58) (0.50) (0.74) (0.59) 
  -0.049  1.154 0.568 0.812 0.624 0.612  post-war dummy 
  (0.94) (0.03)**  (0.36) (0.19) (0.34) (0.33) 
  0.270  0.078  0.080  0.064  0.076  lagged dependent variable 
  (0.00)***  (0.01)***  (0.00)***  (0.02)**  (0.01)*** 
   -0.003  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
   (0.45)  (0.84)  (0.72)  (0.42) 
  -0.151    -0.120  -0.019  log of per capita income 
  (0.44)    (0.62)  (0.92) 
     0.008  0.006  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.00)***  (0.02)** 
     0.003  0.003  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & 
inflation       (0.69)  (0.71) 
   -0.023  -0.022   -0.023  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.53)  (0.55)   (0.53) 
   0.000  0.000   0.000  lagged inflation % 
   (0.13)  (0.12)   (0.13) 
   -0.033  -0.043   -0.034  lagged investment % 
   (0.28)  (0.14)   (0.28) 
  -0.003    0.008    GDP growth % 
  (0.93)    (0.84)   
  0.000    0.000    Inflation % 
  (0.56)    (0.69)   
  -0.032    -0.090    investment % 
  (0.21)    (0.01)***   
  -0.009    -0.035    aid %GNI 
  (0.67)    (0.17)   
    -0.059     lagged aid %GNI 
    (0.00)***    
   -0.025      lagged log of per capita income 
   (0.90)     
  0.000       Dollar overvaluation index 
  ( 0 . 9 1 )       
observations  1862 1862 1498 1571 1542 1557 1571 
Number  of  id  74 74 63 64 63 63 64 
p  values  in  parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                31
 
Appendix 5c: Dooley GLS Results               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.008 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.008     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
  1.130 0.140 0.627 0.633 0.408 0.625  war dummy 
  (0.16) (0.82) (0.36) (0.35) (0.55) (0.36) 
  -0.248  1.242 0.426 0.745 0.421 0.456  post-war dummy 
  (0.77) (0.06)*  (0.56) (0.31) (0.58) (0.54) 
  0.224  0.101  0.109  0.096  0.101  lagged dependent variable 
  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
   0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
   (0.38)  (0.32)  (0.37)  (0.38) 
  0.114    0.114  0.073  log of per capita income 
  (0.65)    (0.69)  (0.75) 
     0.008  0.008  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
     0.005  0.006  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & 
inflation       (0.58)  (0.56) 
   -0.066  -0.074   -0.067  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.15)  (0.11)   (0.14) 
   0.001  0.001   0.001  lagged inflation % 
   (0.02)**  (0.02)**   (0.02)** 
   -0.033  -0.033   -0.032  lagged investment % 
   (0.37)  (0.34)   (0.38) 
  -0.017    -0.028    GDP growth % 
  (0.69)    (0.56)   
  0.000    0.000    Inflation % 
  (0.30)    (0.16)   
  -0.057    -0.097    investment %GDP 
  (0.09)*    (0.01)***   
  0.008    -0.011    aid %GNI 
  (0.76)    (0.73)   
    -0.070     lagged aid %GNI 
    (0.00)***    
   0.082      Lagged log of per capita income 
   (0.72)     
  0.000       Dollar overvaluation index 
  ( 0 . 9 7 )       
observations  1852 1852 1502 1574 1545 1561 1574 
Number  of  id  72 72 62 63 62 62 63 
p  values  in  parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   32
 
Appendix 6a: World Bank Within-Group Results              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.009 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.008     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
  -0.224 -0.445 -0.446 -0.680 -0.583 -0.408  war dummy 
  (0.76) (0.51) (0.52) (0.32) (0.40) (0.56) 
  -1.288 -0.224 -0.930 -0.872 -1.073 -0.923  post-war dummy 
  (0.21) (0.76) (0.36) (0.29) (0.29) (0.37) 
    0.131 0.034 0.048 0.034 0.033  dependent variable: 1st lag 
    (0.04)**  (0.78) (0.67) (0.77) (0.79) 
   -0.001  -0.002 -0.002 -0.001  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
   (0.24)  (0.09)*  (0.21)  (0.28) 
  2.280    3.998  2.978  log of per capita income 
  (0.03)**    (0.06)*  (0.19) 
     0.008  0.008  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
     0.006  0.006  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.05)**  (0.04)** 
   -0.038  -0.041   -0.043  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.32)  (0.32)   (0.28) 
   0.001  0.001   0.001  lagged inflation % 
   (0.10)  (0.12)   (0.11) 
   -0.102  -0.050   -0.100  lagged investment % 
   (0.12)  (0.20)   (0.12) 
  -0.001    0.006    GDP growth % 
  (0.97)    (0.86)   
  0.000    0.001    inflation % 
  (0.34)    (0.21)   
  - 0 . 1 0 7     - 0 . 1 5 8     investment % GDP 
  (0.00)***    (0.02)**   
  0.129    0.114    aid % GNI 
  (0.15)    (0.16)   
    - 0 . 1 1 0      lagged aid % GNI 
    ( 0 . 5 5 )     
   3.079      lagged log of per capita income 
   ( 0 . 1 8 )      
  - 0 . 0 0 1        Dollar overvaluation index 
  ( 0 . 1 6 )       
observations  1891 1891 1530 1603 1574 1590 1603 
Number  of  id  74 74 63 64 63 63 64 
R-squared  0.10 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Robust p values in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                33
 
Appendix 6b: Morgan Within-Group Results               
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) 
0.009 0.009 0.004 0.005  0.005      Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.21)  (0.04)** (0.07)*     
  0.733 0.287 0.271  0.107  0.299 0.282  war dummy 
  (0.36) (0.72) (0.73)  (0.89)  (0.71) (0.72) 
  0.336 0.908 0.931  0.652  0.950 0.952  post-war dummy 
  (0.77) (0.36) (0.36)  (0.49)  (0.34) (0.35) 
    -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001  Dollar overvaluation index 
    (0.23)  (0.17) (0.18) (0.23)  (0.17) 
    0.148  0.151 0.154 0.146  0.151  dependent variable: 1st lag 
    (0.02)**  (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)**  (0.01)** 
    2.541    2.577  1.190  log of per capita income 
    (0.02)**    (0.02)**  (0.37) 
       0.005  0.006  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
       (0.21)  (0.04)** 
       0.003  0.003  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
       (0.41)  (0.38) 
   -0.028  -0.022   -0.029  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.42)  (0.56)   (0.40) 
   0.000  0.000   0.000  lagged inflation % 
   (0.40)  (0.50)   (0.41) 
   -0.058  -0.044   -0.056  lagged investment % 
   (0.17)  (0.21)   (0.17) 
    -0.008    -0.008    GDP growth % 
    (0.82)    (0.81)   
    0.000    0.000    Inflation % 
    (0.14)    (0.15)   
    -0.114    -0.114    investment % 
    (0.00)***    (0.00)***   
    0.105    0.104    aid %GNI 
    (0.30)    (0.29)   
     0.063     lagged aid % GNI 
     (0.49)    
   1.338       lagged log of per capita income 
   (0.33)      
observations  1862 1862 1498 1511  1483  1498 1511 
Number  of  id  74 74 63 64  63  63 64 
R-squared  0.11 0.11 0.14 0.14  0.14  0.14 0.14 
Robust p values in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                34
 
Appendix 6c: Dooley Within-Group Results               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
0.008 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.007     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
  -0.249 -0.708 -0.243 -0.524 -0.437 -0.272  war dummy 
  (0.77) (0.39) (0.78) (0.53) (0.60) (0.75) 
  -2.000 -0.609 -1.201 -1.058 -1.336 -1.319  post-war dummy 
  (0.09)*  (0.49) (0.29) (0.27) (0.24) (0.25) 
    0.123 0.068 0.080 0.068 0.068  dependent variable: 1st  lag 
    (0.01)***  (0.32) (0.22) (0.32) (0.33) 
   -0.002  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
   (0.19)  (0.05)*  (0.15)  (0.23) 
  2.783    4.989  3.280  log of per capita income 
  (0.04)**    (0.03)**  (0.17) 
     0.007  0.007  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
     0.009  0.010  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
     (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
   -0.076  -0.084   -0.081  lagged GDP growth 
   (0.13)  (0.11)   (0.11) 
   0.001  0.001   0.001  lagged inflation % 
   (0.13)  (0.16)   (0.14) 
   -0.117  -0.047   -0.110  lagged investment % 
   (0.19)  (0.51)   (0.20) 
  - 0 . 0 3 7     - 0 . 0 4 3     GDP growth % 
  (0.49)    (0.42)   
  0.000    0.001    inflation % 
  (0.36)    (0.19)   
  - 0 . 1 5 3     - 0 . 2 1 5     investment % GDP 
  (0.02)**    (0.02)**   
  0.109    0.120    aid %GNI 
  (0.25)    (0.15)   
    - 0 . 1 6 1      lagged aid %GNI 
    ( 0 . 4 1 )     
   3.759      lagged log of per capita income 
   ( 0 . 1 2 )      
  - 0 . 0 0 2        Dollar overvaluation index 
  ( 0 . 1 1 )       
Observations  1852 1852 1502 1574 1545 1561 1574 
Number  of  id  72 72 62 63 62 62 63 
R-squared  0.05 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Robust p values in parentheses               
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        35
 
Appendix 7a: World Bank 2SLS Results               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.009 0.007 0.008     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
0.078 0.080 0.184 0.076 0.183  war dummy 
(0.87) (0.87) (0.69) (0.87) (0.69) 
0.809 0.516 0.790 0.889 0.855  post-war dummy 
(0.45) (0.58) (0.46) (0.42) (0.44) 
-0.016 -0.023   -0.017   GDP growth % 
(0.65) (0.50)   (0.64)  
0.001 0.000   0.001   Inflation % 
(0.20) (0.23)   (0.20)  
-0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
(0.76) (0.53) (0.97) (0.73) (0.95) 
-0.029 -0.033   -0.029   investment %GDP 
(0.35) (0.26)   (0.35)  
-0.064 -0.073 -0.023 -0.061 -0.021  aid %GNI 
(0.54) (0.47) (0.83) (0.56) (0.85) 
 0.164      lagged dependent variable 
 (0.19)     
   0.009  0.008  Interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
   0.003  0.004  Interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.27)  (0.23) 
  -0.045   -0.045  lagged GDP growth 
  (0.26)   (0.26) 
  0.001   0.001  lagged inflation % 
  (0.06)*   (0.07)* 
  0.002   0.002  lagged investment % 
  (0.96)   (0.95) 
observations  1565 1561 1549 1565 1549 














Robust p values in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%              36
 
Appendix 7b: Morgan 2SLS Results            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.009 0.008 0.008     Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***    
0.082 0.016 0.180 0.079 0.178  war dummy 
(0.85) (0.97) (0.68) (0.86) (0.69) 
0.682 0.402 0.648 0.743 0.694  post-war dummy 
(0.53) (0.69) (0.56) (0.51) (0.54) 
-0.025 -0.026   -0.025   GDP growth % 
(0.47) (0.43)   (0.47)  
0.000 0.000   0.000   Inflation % 
(0.04)** (0.11)    (0.04)**  
0.000 -0.002  -0.001  0.000 -0.001  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
(0.96) (0.84) (0.88) (0.98) (0.86) 
-0.033 -0.035   -0.032   investment %GDP 
(0.30) (0.25)   (0.31)  
0.006 0.001 0.055 0.011 0.060  aid %GNI 
(0.96) (1.00) (0.68) (0.93) (0.65) 
 0.162      lagged dependent variable 
 (0.14)     
   0.009  0.008  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
   0.004  0.005  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.14)  (0.11) 
  -0.057   -0.058  lagged GDP growth % 
  (0.16)   (0.16) 
  0.000   0.000  lagged inflation % 
  (0.11)   (0.11) 
  0.003   0.004  lagged investment % 
  (0.92)   (0.90) 
observations  1536 1528 1520 1536 1520 













Robust p values in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%              37
 
Appendix 7c: Dooley 2SLS Results             
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
0.009 0.008 0.008      Inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***     
0.243 0.173 0.432  0.237 0.429  war dummy 
(0.67) (0.77) (0.45)  (0.68) (0.45) 
0.869 0.656 0.760  0.957 0.816  post-war dummy 
(0.45) (0.54) (0.50)  (0.42) (0.49) 
-0.089 -0.090   -0.090   GDP growth % 
(0.13) (0.12)   (0.13)  
0.000 0.000   0.000   Inflation 
(0.30) (0.33)   (0.30)  
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
(0.98) (0.74) (0.83)  (0.97) (0.83) 
-0.109 -0.099   -0.109   investment %GDP 
(0.05)** (0.06)*    (0.05)**  
-0.195 -0.184 -0.138  -0.197 -0.139  aid %GNI 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.35)  (0.16) (0.34) 
 0.155       lagged dependent variable 
 (0.04)**      
    0.009  0.008  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
    (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
    0.003  0.005  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
    (0.32)  (0.17) 
  -0.093   -0.093  lagged GDP growth % 
  (0.07)*   (0.07)* 
  0.001   0.001  lagged inflation % 
  (0.10)   (0.10) 
  -0.060   -0.061  lagged investment % 
  (0.31)   (0.31) 
observations  1536 1532 1520  1536 1520 














Robust p values in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%            38
 
Appendix 8: First-Stage Regression Results of Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.006 0.006 0.006     inflation & post-war dummy interaction term 
(0.04)** (0.03)** (0.04)**    
0.046 -0.037  0.090 0.052 0.101  war dummy 
(0.95) (0.96) (0.90) (0.94) (0.89) 
1.291 0.992 1.173 1.596 1.457  post-war dummy 
(0.15) (0.27) (0.19) (0.09)*  (0.11) 
-0.099 -0.105   -0.103   GDP growth % 
(0.35) (0.33)   (0.34)  
-0.000 -0.000   -0.000   inflation % 
(0.12) (0.12)   (0.12)  
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002  lagged Dollar overvaluation index 
(0.07)* (0.08)* (0.14) (0.07)*  (0.14) 
-0.101 -0.093   -0.100   investment %GDP 
(0.00)*** (0.00)***   (0.00)***  
Interaction terms with donor aid to GNI ratio %       
2.118 2.093 2.018 2.087 1.990  French language dummy  
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
2.2 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.2  French religion dummy 
(0.00)*** (0.02)**  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
8,302 7,146 8,616 7,899 8,222  Inverse of distance from France 
(0.01)** (0.05)** (0.01)** (0.02)** (0.02)** 
-0.174 -0.188 -0.525 -0.161 -0.518  UK language dummy 
(0.78) (0.77) (0.44) (0.79) (0.44) 
-0.249 -0.040 0.130  -0.246 0.139  UK religion dummy 
(0.79) (0.97) (0.89) (0.80) (0.88) 
-137 -804 227  134  485  Inverse of distance from UK 
(0.94) (0.64) (0.89) (0.94) (0.77) 
3.850 5.013 4.693 3.824 4.678  US language dummy 
(0.04)** (0.01)** (0.03)** (0.04)** (0.03)** 
5.154 3.825 3.951 5.175 3.959  US religion dummy 
(0.08)* (0.20)  (0.18) (0.07)*  (0.18) 
-10,957  -6,234 -9,994 -11,265  -10,279  Inverse of distance from US 
(0.00)*** (0.12)  (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** 
-8,583 -11,766  -7,742 -9,345 -8,493  Inverse of distance from Japan 
(0.10)* (0.03)**  (0.13) (0.07)*  (0.09)* 
-3.183 -3.505 -2.916 -3.221 -2.949  German religion dummy 
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** 
-11,249 -10,756 -10,941 -11,295 -10,972  inverse of distance from Germany 
(0.02)** (0.04)** (0.03)** (0.02)** (0.03)** 
 0.077      Lagged aid  
 (0.26)     
   0.006  0.006  interaction term: 1st 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.04)**  (0.04)** 
   -0.013  -0.013  interaction term: 2nd 5 post-war years & inflation 
   (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
  0.009   0.008  lagged GDP growth % 
  (0.86)   (0.87) 
  0.000   0.000  lagged inflation % 
  (0.51)   (0.51) 
  -0.155   -0.154  lagged investment % 
  (0.00)***   (0.00)*** 
observations  1568 1514 1551 1568 1551 
R-squared  0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 










Robust p values in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 